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Certain commandments are automatically obligatory, e.g., praying, reciting shema, eating matza on the first night of Passover, etc. Other commandments, however, seem to be obligatory only if one chooses to do a voluntary act. For example, there is an obligation perform shechita (ritual slaughter) to allow the consumption of meat. This is not generally assumed to mean that one is required to eat meat in order to fulfill the mitzva of shechita. In contrast, the gemara in Menachoth (41a) says that in a time of divine anger, people are judged for not wearing tzitzith even though they did not wear garments that are eligible for the mitzva:

מלאכא אשכחי' לרב קטינא דמיכסי סדינא אמר ליה קטינא קטינא סדינא בקייטא וסרבלא בסיתוא ציצית של תכלת מה תהא עליה אמר ליה ענשיתו אעשה אמר ליה בזמן דאיכא ריתחא ענשינן אי אמרת בשלמא חובת גברא הוא היינו דמחייב דלא קא רמי אלא אי אמרת חובת טלית הוא הא לא מיחייבא אלא מאי חובת גברא הוא נהי דחייביה רחמנא כי מיכסי טלית דבת חיובא כי מיכסי טלית דלאו בת חיובא היא מי חייביה רחמנא אלא הכי קאמר ליה טצדקי למיפטר נפשך מציצית

For an angel once found R. Kattina wearing a linen wrap, and he exclaimed, ‘Kattina, Kattina, a wrap in summer and a cloak in winter, and what is to happen to the law of zizith?’ ‘And do you punish’, asked R. Kattina, ‘a person [who omits to perform] a positive precept?’ ‘In a time of wrath’, replied the angel, ‘we do’. Now if you hold that the law of zizith is an obligation incumbent upon the person then that is why one would incur guilt for not wearing a garment with fringes; but if you hold that it is an obligation attaching to the garment, then why [is any guilt incurred] seeing that these garments are exempt? What then do you hold? That it is an obligation incumbent upon the person? I grant you that the All — Merciful would punish one who wears [without fringes] a garment that is subject to fringes, but would the All-Merciful punish one who wears [without fringes] a garment that is not subject to it? — This is what [the angel] implied, ‘You find every excuse to free yourself from the law of zizith’.

See also the Rambam Hilchoth Tzitzith 3:11:

אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין אָדָם מְחֻיָּב לִקְנוֹת לוֹ טַלִּית וּלְהִתְעַטֵּף בָּהּ כְּדֵי שֶׁיַּעֲשֶׂה בָּהּ צִיצִית אֵין רָאוּי לְאָדָם חָסִיד שֶׁיִּפְטֹר עַצְמוֹ מִמִּצְוָה זוֹ. אֶלָּא לְעוֹלָם יִשְׁתַּדֵּל לִהְיוֹת עָטוּף בִּכְסוּת הַמְחֻיֶּבֶת בַּצִּיצִית כְּדֵי שֶׁיְּקַיֵּם מִצְוָה זוֹ. וּבִשְׁעַת הַתְּפִלָּה צָרִיךְ לְהִזָּהֵר בְּיוֹתֵר. גְּנַאי גָּדוֹל הוּא לְתַלְמִידֵי חֲכָמִים שֶׁיִּתְפַּלְּלוּ וְהֵם אֵינָם עֲטוּפִים

Even though a person is not obligated to buy himself a talith and to wrap himself in it in order to make for it tzitzith, it is unfitting for a pious person to exempt himself from this commandment. Rather, he should always put in the effort to be wrapped in a garment obligated in tzitzith in order to fulfill this mitzva. And at time of prayer he should be exceptionally careful (to wear such a garment). It is a great disgrace for scholars to pray without being wrapped (in such a garment).

Along similar lines, I believe Rav Moshe Feinstein, z"l, wrote a responsum encouraging his grandson to wear wool tzitzith even in the summer in order to fulfill the biblical obligation even according to those (e.g. the Rambam) who hold cotton garments are biblically exempt from the obligation (as opposed to, e.g., the Rama who holds that even cotton garments are biblically obligated in tzitzith.

What are the criteria by which a mitzva which is not automatically obligatory, still suggests at least an ideal to self-obligate in order to fulfill the commandment? For example, is one obligated to desire an egg in order to fulfill shiluach haken? Is the idea expressed in Menachoth limited to tzitzith?

Loewian
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  • The mitzvah of tzitzis may be different, see kol bo for example, top of second column. –  Jun 08 '17 at 15:06
  • Perhaps you mean Menachot 41 where it says that at a time of divine anger people will be judged for going out of their way to avoid the obligation of tzitzit by avoiding wearing four cornered garments? That's not what you cite though – Double AA Jun 08 '17 at 17:55
  • @Ploni Other mitzvoth, however, also have unique significance, e.g. shiluach haken which mentions arikhuth yamim. – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 00:09
  • @DoubleAA I did and I see your point. Though the custom seems to be much more strict (in which case the question at least stands with regard to the custom). – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 00:39
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    @Loewian I don't know what you mean by the question stands with regard to the custom which seems to be much more strict. A custom can exist to wear four cornered garments, but that says nothing about retaliation during times of divine anger. It just potentially says that customs can be binding. If there were a custom to shekht a chicken every day at 2pm, that too could be binding. But there isn't. – Double AA Jul 06 '17 at 00:43
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    You may be thinking of Igrot Moshe 2:1 where he said that for the Hiddur of wearing Tzitzit always to avoid divine wrath one can rely on the Rama that even non-wool is obligated. The responsum is addressed to a Yehuda Bodenheimer who doesn't seem to be his grandson. – Double AA Jul 06 '17 at 01:04
  • @DoubleAA Either way, the sources do seem to assume that one should try to wear tzitzith. And, on second review, that may indeed be because yours is not the accepted interpretation of the text. – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 01:05
  • @DoubleAA Not the one I'm thinking of but valuable nonetheless. – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 01:06
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    "The sources" huh? What sources? All of them? Making up anonymous and ambiguous groupings isn't going to convince me of anything. Wearing Tzitzit is good. Going out of your way to avoid it is bad. If you happen to not wear them but didn't go out of your way to do so, then no big deal unless your local or ancestral custom otherwise obligates you to in which case we're back to where we started. – Double AA Jul 06 '17 at 01:07
  • @DoubleAA Gemara, Rambam, Shulchan Aruch, Igros Moshe, etc. In any case, my core question is if there is a distinction and why. If you feel you have an answer, by all means. – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 01:55
  • You are lumping together completely disparate views! Rambam doenst hold you have to wear tsitsit! He holds that it is praiseworthy to remind yourself of all the mitsvot so that you are kadosh and don't stray after your heart and eyes! It is clear from Rambam, Rabbenu Avraham, Tur, and the Shulhan Arukh that there is no obligation to don a four cornered garment, and that the reason to is not because it is a mitsvah, but because it achieves a desired end; remembering God. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:07
  • This is a dupe of https://judaism.stackexchange.com/q/82981/8775. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:11
  • @mevaqesh As it currently stands, the question asks: "What are the criteria by which a mitzva which is not automatically obligatory, still suggests at least an ideal to self-obligate in order to fulfill the commandment?" - I'm not sure why you don't think those words reflect the view of the the Rambam? – Loewian Jul 07 '17 at 13:48
  • Simple. My problem wasn't with those words, It was with the presentation of rambam regarding tsitsit. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 14:16
  • @mevaqesh I'm not sure I follow how exactly you are reading my words. – Loewian Jul 07 '17 at 18:24
  • Simple. You are lumping together Rambam with those who require one to wear tsitsit and or think that it is somehow mandatory. This is quite false. This was basically noted by DoubleAA here. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 19:23
  • @mevaqesh Perhaps you can highlight which exactly are the words to which you object and I can evaluate if you have a point and edit accordingly. – Loewian Jul 09 '17 at 15:09
  • Should one desire to fulfill the mitzvah of writing and giving a divorce to one's wife? – Isaac Kotlicky Jul 12 '17 at 16:35
  • @IsaacKotlicky Similarly, should one steal in order to fulfill the commandment to return that which one stole. See WFB's answer to this post and sources therein and comments thereon. – Loewian Jul 12 '17 at 18:29

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In a long teshuvah in his Chevel Nachalato, R. Yaakov Epstein cites many sources on this subject--it would seem from his citations that many Rishonim view the case in Menachot as anomalous for one reason or another:

1) Rif, commentary attributed to Rashba on Menachot--the Gemara is referring to a case in which R. Kattina was wearing a garment obligated in tzitzit; according to this view, there is no source that one must go out of his way to obligate himself, because in this case, R. Kattina was already obligated.

2) Maharsha--R. Kattina was punished because of his stature; according to this view, this Gemara can only be generalized to people like R. Kattina.

3) Tosfot, Mordekhai, Rosh--this Gemara applies only in times when everyone usually wore four-cornered garments; according to this view, this can be generalized only when avoiding a mitzvah that one usually would have to perform.

On the other hand, R. Yosef Gikatilla in his Klalei HaMitzvot writes as follows:

יש מצות עשה שאדם חייב לרדוף אחריהם לקיימן כדי שלא יהא בכלל פושעי ישראל בגופן, כגון תפלין וסוכה ולולב וכיוצא בהן, ואלו הן הנקראות חובה. ויש מצות עשה שהם מצד אחד חובה ומצד שני דומות כמו רשות כגון מזוזה ומעקה וכיוצא בהן, שאין אדם חייב לשכון בבית בהכרח כדי שיעשה מזוזה או לבנות בית בהכרח כדי לעשות מעקה, ומ"מ מצד קיום המצוה חייב אדם להשתדל לעשותה, כדגרסינן בפרק התכלת (מנחות מג ב) ר' אליעזר בן יעקב אומר כל שיש לו תפלין בראשו ובזרועו וציצית בבגדו ומזוזה בפתחו מוחזקני בו שלא יחטא שנאמר והחוט המשולש לא במהרה ינתק, ואומר חונה מלאך ה' סביב ליראיו ויחלצם ומדרך זה חייב אדם לרדוף אחר המצות כולן ולקיים כל מה שאפשר לו מהן לקיימן, ולהיותו משתוקק וכוסף ומתאוה גם אחר המצות שאינו יכול לקיימן, ועל זה עתיד לקבל שכר, דגרסינן בסוטה סוף פ"ק (סוטה יד א) דרש ר' שמלאי מפני מה נתאוה משה ליכנס לארץ ישראל כדי לאכול פירות ולשבוע מטובה הוא צריך, אלא אמר משה הרבה מצות נצטוו ישראל ואינן מתקיימות אלא בארץ ישראל, אמר אכנס לארץ כדי שיתקיימו על ידי, א"ל הקב"ה כלום אתה צריך אלא לקבל שכר הריני מעלה לך כאילו עשיתם שנאמר לכן אחלק לו ברבים, שאני מחלק לו שכר שלם וכו'. ולפיכך ראוי לו לאדם לחזור אחר כל מצוה שהיא תלויה בדבר אחר כדי שתתקיים על ידו ויהיה זוכה לשכר כולן, וכבר ביארנו זה במלת "בטל" ויתבאר במלת "רשות".

According to this view, one is obligated to try to fulfill mitzvot such as mezuzah and maakeh. Similarly, R. Eliezer Azikri in his Sefer Charedim (hakdamah lemitzvot, 2) writes:

מצות עשה שלא יתחייב אדם בהן כי אם בסיבה, כגון מזוזה... וכן מצות מעקה ... וכן ציצית ... ובתרומה ומעשר ...וכן מצות נתינת שכר שכיר ביומו, שאם לא ישכור אדם שכיר אין כאן מצות נתינה, ופעמים שלא תבא הסיבה לאדם כל ימיו ונמצא שלא עשה אותה מצוה לעולם. ועל כל כיוצא במצות אלו, אין בית דין של מטה מענישין את האדם על מה שאינו משתדל להביא עצמו לידי חיוב כדי לקיים אותן, אבל בית דין של מעלה מענישין עליהם כשיש חרון אף בעולם, כדאיתא במסכת מנחות (מא א) שנגלה מלאך לרב קטינא ואמר לו אתה בלא ציצית בעבור שבגדיך פטורים, אם כן מצות ציצית מה תהא עליה...ולשון הרב רבינו יונה גם על מצות כאלה אמרו ז"ל ענוש יענש לעתות בצרה על דבר אשר לא חמד בלבבו יופי המצוה ושכרה לבעבור סבב פני דבר חיובה עליו (ש"ג אות כב). ובפרק ערבי פסחים (דף קי"ג ב) אמרו דמי שאין לו ציצית בבגדו הוי מנודה לשמים, וכתבו על זה התוספות, ומיירי דיש לו ואינו מניחו. אי נמי אפילו אין לו, יש לו לחזור ולהביא עצמו לידי חיוב, כדאשכחן במשה שהיה תאב ליכנס לארץ ישראל כדי לקיים המצות התלויות בה

Sefer Charedim too requires one to go out of his way to attempt to fulfill mitzvot in which he would not otherwise have been obligated, including hiring workers to pay them on time.

[It is only according to the view of Sefer Charedim, that one is obligated to look for opportunities to become obligated in new mitzvot, that one might entertain the possibility that one who has never sinned may perform an aveirah so as to fulfill the mitzvah of teshuvah. (See, e.g., here, no. 188.) Obviously, however, this is not a necessary conclusion of Sefer Charedim's view. Interestingly, in Klalei HaMitzvot, erekh "Reshut," R. Yosef Gikatilla explicitly repudiates this approach: הנה יש מצות עשה הרבה כי מי יתן שלא יצטרך אדם לעשותם לעולם ולא הן ולא שכרן, כגון מקצת מצות הבאות בקרבנות על כפרת עבירות שאדם עושה כגון חטאות ואשמות וכיוצא בהן, כדגרסינן בפרק מי שמתו (ברכות כג א) שמור רגלך כאשר תלך אל בית האלקים, שמור רגלך שלא תחטא משתחטא ותביא קרבן לפני. ושמור עיקר זה במצות כי גדול הוא מאד. See also ch. 4 of this book.]

The Darkei Teshuvah (beginning of hilkhot shechitah and hashmatot there) asks this question with regard to shechitah--should one attempt to perform shechitah in order to avoid punishment at a time of God's wrath? He cites Ibn Ezra's Yesod Mora which in turn relates that a certain pious individual looked to perform shechitah in order to fulfill the requirement of reciting 100 berakhot. The Darkei Teshuvah infers from this that one is not required to seek out to perform the mitzvah of shechitah, as the protagonist in Ibn Ezra's story was only concerned about the obligation of 100 berakhot.

Obviously, this question only arises if we assume: 1) one is supposed to perform mitzvot even if he is not obligated to perform them; 2) shechitah is considered a mitzvah (against the view of Raavad, Ramban, Tosfot, Rosh, Tashbetz, Taz, Gra, etc.). Nevertheless, even if we make both of these assumptions, there may be a significant distinction between tzitzit and shechitah: Regarding shechitah there is never a situation in which one is obligated to perform the mitzvah. In the case of tzitzit, however, one who is wearing a four-cornered garment is obligated to place tzitzit on its corners. (See R. Barukh Shmuel Deutsch in his Birkat Kohen, Chullin.)

Regarding the mitzvah of shiluach ha-ken, the Pitchei Teshuvah (Yoreh Deah 292:1) cites Mishnat Chachamim (Tzofnat Paneach 5) who claims that one is only obligated to perform the mitzvah if one has already taken the birds (in which case one has already violated a negative commandment). Even so, if one encounters a nest and does not send away the mother bird, he is punished at a time of divine wrath. The aforementioned Darkei Teshuvah himself maintains that failure to perform shechitah does not warrant punishment because it entails destruction of a creature; I am not sure whether this logic would apply as well to shiluach ha-ken.

A similar question arises with regard to doing something to avoid fulfilling a mitzvah. R. Hershel Schachter in his Be'Ikvei HaTzon cites Bekhorot 3b as proof that one is not allowed to exempt himself from a mitzvah:

רב מרי בר רחל הו"ל ההיא חיותא, הוה מקנה לאודנייהו לעובד כוכבים ואסר להו בגיזה ועבודה ויהיב להו לכהנים, וכלאי חיותא דרב מרי בר רחל, וכו' משום דמפקע להו מקדושתייהו

R. Mari b. Rahel possessed a herd of animals. He used to transfer [to a heathen] possession of the ears [of the firstlings while still in the womb]... The herd of R. Mari b. Rahel died... Because he deprived them of their holiness.

However, others note that this case may be different because:

1) One is subverting the sanctity of the animal, not only exempting oneself from a mitzvah; perhaps only subversion of sanctity is problematic.

2) According to one opinion in the Gemara, R. Mari was only punished because others who were ignorant of the relevant laws would learn from his example, but otherwise one would be allowed to exempt himself from a mitzvah (see R. Tzvi Pesach Frank, Har Tzvi al HaTorah, Ki Tisa; compare Maharsha cited above). It would seem reasonable that this question is also related to the Gemara in Menachot 41a (and indeed R. Schachter cites this Gemara as well).

A final passage that relates to this question is Berakhot 35b:

ואמר רבה בר בר חנה אמר רבי יוחנן משום רבי יהודה ברבי אלעאי: בא וראה שלא כדורות הראשונים דורות האחרונים; דורות הראשונים היו מכניסין פירותיהן דרך טרקסמון - כדי לחייבן במעשר, דורות האחרונים מכניסין פירותיהן דרך גגות דרך חצרות דרך קרפיפות - כדי לפטרן מן המעשר; דאמר רבי ינאי: אין הטבל מתחייב במעשר עד שיראה פני הבית

Rabbah b. Bar Hanah further said in the name of R. Johanan reporting R. Judah b. Ila'i: Observe the difference between the earlier and the later generations. The earlier generations used to bring in their produce by way of the kitchen-garden purposely in order to make it liable to tithe, whereas the later generations bring in their produce by way of roofs or courtyards or enclosures in order to make it exempt from tithe. For R. Jannai has said: Untithed produce is not subject to tithing until it has come within sight of the house, since it says. I have put away the hallowed things out of my house. R. Johanan, however, says that even [sight of] a courtyard imposes the obligation, as it says, That they may eat within thy gates and be satisfied.

This Gemara seems to imply that it is a discredit to the later generations that they avoided the obligation. R. Kook in his Ein Ayah (on the Gemara in Berakhot) comments:

ההבדל שיש בין המכיר ערך המצות ותכליתן הנשגבה וחפץ בהן באמת ובין מי שעבודתו היא רק מצות אנשים מלומדה הוכן להיות יוצא אל הפועל בהרבה מצות מן התורה, שנמצאו בהם דרכים ע"פ דין תורה להפקיע החיוב מעצמו. אמנם רק בזה יוודע שלימות העובד מאהבה, בהיות לאל ידו לפטור עצמו ובהיותו מכיר את ערך המצוה וקדושתה הוא נכנס להתחייב בה. ע"כ במצות מעשרות, שהיא המצוה הראשית המחזקת את כל אושר הכלל כולו, בהיותה לברית בין המיוחדים לעבודת ד' שבט הלוי ובין כל העם כולו, דאגה החכמה האלהית ביותר שתהי' נעשיח ע"פ רוח נדיבה המכרת את ערכה הגדול. ע"כ נתנה מקום להחלץ ממנה [ע"י] הכנסה דרך גגות חצירו' וקרפיפות, למען שתגיע הרגשת העושה לעשות המצוה מיקרת רוח ונפש נדיבה, שבזה תצא אל הפועל תכליתה להשלים את הכלל כולו כחפץ האדון השם יתברך.

See also here for a discussion of הערמה; and see Pesachim 48b: אמר רב יוסף הני נשי דידן נהוג למיפא קפיזא קפיזא [רש"י: שלשת לוגין לחומרא לשומרו מן החימוץ] לפיסחא. א"ל אביי מאי דעתיך לחומרא? חומרא דאתי לידי קולא הוא, דקא מפקע לה מחלה

wfb
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  • That's a fairly difficult Chanukas Hatorah - Did the Yaavetz have anything to say about it? (And what happened to mitzva haba b'aveira?) And would stealing then be a problem of ein osin mitzvos chavilos chavilos? – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 15:30
  • I'm also not sure that the line you draw between tzitzis and shechita is as distinct as you make out. Tzitzis, to my understanding, is that you're obligated to have put tzitzis on the (4-cornered) garment you wear; shechita=obligation to have shechted the meat that you eat. Technically, it seems both actions of mitzvos hechsher (tying and slaughtering) should have been done prior to the obligating acts of wearing and eating. – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 15:34
  • You could also tie in women and mitzvos aseh shehazman grama. Also, does the RI Gikatilla spell out at all what the criteria for distinction are between his classes of mitzvos? – Loewian Jul 06 '17 at 15:37
  • to respond to your comments in order @Loewian 1. the idea is generally considered Sabbatean, but seems to precede Shabbetai Tzvi. 2. The obligation of tzitzit only begins once one is wearing the garment. 3. I only saw the excerpt I cited. – wfb Jul 06 '17 at 16:30
  • @Loewian I added another paragraph to the Klalei HaMitzvot citation; it is pretty clear that he considers this to be true for all mitzvot, though he does not cite Menachot 41a – wfb Jul 06 '17 at 16:56
  • @Loewian also added another excerpt to address your 1st comment above – wfb Jul 06 '17 at 17:03
  • Let us continue this discussion in chat. – Loewian Jul 07 '17 at 04:56
  • "According to this view, one is obligated to try to fulfill mitzvot such as mezuzah and maakeh." That seems to slightly overstate his position. While he does indeed state חייב אדם להשתדל לעשותה, that is in contradistinction to "מצות עשה שאדם חייב לרדוף אחריהם לקיימן", furthermore, regarding these very same mitsvot, he states שאין אדם חייב, it therefore seems pretty clear (or at least probable) that his intent isnt to a formal obligation, but to the right thing to do, as he concludes: ולפיכך ראוי לו לאדם לחזור. Something proper but not mandated. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:23
  • Furthermore, it should be clarified that the whole focus seems to be on attaining the attitude that serving God is the only thing truly valuable to a person. According to Ri Gikatillia, it isnt that mitsvot kiyumiyot are themselves mandatory; or even partially mandatory (whatever that would mean), but rather that the attitude that service of God, and by extension mitsvit, is is valuable and to be pursued, is the goal. The whole point is the pursuit: לרדוף אחר המצות כולן, indeed since it is about the attitude, not the act it applied equally to cases where he does not do any mitsvah: [cont.] – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:27
  • ולהיותו משתוקק וכוסף ומתאוה גם אחר המצות שאינו יכול לקיימן. This emphasis on attaining a state of mind where one's whole focus is on serving God, is typical of Jewish literature, cf. בכל דרכיך דעהו and Rambam discussion of that verse in ch. 5 of Shemonah Ferakim. There does not appear to be any evidence that Ri Gikatillia holds anything that Rif and Rashba would disagree with. | The one element of hiddush to be noted, is that he implies that all mitsvot have value. What he would include, remains a question. Shehita? – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:38
  • +1 But please clarify your presentation of RI Gikatillia to incorporate the above... – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:39
  • " אבל בית דין של מעלה מענישין עליהם כשיש חרון אף בעולם" This is a massive statement not stated by Ri Gikatillia. IMHO this distinction should be noted. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:41
  • "על דבר אשר לא חמד בלבבו יופי המצוה ושכרה לבעבור סבב פני דבר חיובה עליו" Interestingly, this sounds exactly like my explication of Ri Gikatillia (which I think is clear from his words), and not like the Sefer Haredim. The point is about wanting mitsvot not doing them. Doing them for some reasn other than love for the mitsvah would not seem to be included in Rabbenu Yoah, just as it doesn not seem to be included in Ri Gikatillia. Although the simple readong of the Haredim admittedly implies that he disagrees. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:43
  • "Sefer Charedim too requires one to go out of his way" Strictly speaking he just says that if one doesn't one risks punishment in time of divine wrath, although the two are admittedly very similar. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:54
  • "Interestingly, in Klalei HaMitzvot, erekh "Reshut," R. Yosef Gikatilla explicitly repudiates this approach" That being the case, consider clarifying more clearly what his view is (along the lines of what I delineated) and how it differs from the Haredim's view. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:55
  • "This Gemara seems to imply that it is a discredit to the later generations that they avoided the obligation." Alternatively, it is to the credit of the earlier generations that they did something unnecessary, extra, and thus exemplary. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 05:58
  • Sorry for the volume of comments. This was a very long thorough and if I do say so myself, interesting, informative, and action packed post. Thus, there was a lot to discuss. Other than a few points that could be sourced better, and those nuances I felt were conflated, or misrepresented, this was in IMHO a great post, that with a little work could become even better. – mevaqesh Jul 07 '17 at 06:03
  • @mevaqesh I agree with the thrust of your comments and I will try to add some of the missing sources. Ein Ayah is on the Gemara in Berakhot; Darkei Teshuvah is beginning of hilkhot shechitah and hashmatot there; Charedim is hakdamah lemitzvot, 2 – wfb Jul 07 '17 at 12:11
  • I would be happy to edit this if you are interested. If you don't like, you can roll back. – mevaqesh Jul 09 '17 at 06:25