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As self-driving cars are becoming more common, I hear more and more people talking about the benefits when most of the cars on the road are self-driving and programming can optimize traffic flow. This, in turn, makes me wonder about other things that could be programmed in. One thing that programmers of self-driving cars (or governments that regulate them) could implement is an algorithm that minimizes overall damage in the case of an accident. For example, if a self-driving car is about to have a head-on collision with a loaded school bus, the car might avoid the accident by driving off the road, killing its passengers.

A human driver might make the same decision, but I understand that to be the unusual case. My question is about passengers in self-driving cars who wouldn't, were they driving, make the decision to sacrifice themselves on the spur of the moment.

What halachic issues would face the person who either owns or hires (e.g. through Uber) a self-driving car programmed in this way? A few aspects of the question seem relevant (there are probably others):

  • From the story in Bava Metzia 62b of the two people in the desert with enough water for one, where we learn (per R' Akiva) that the owner of the water bottle has priority, we might conclude that the owner/hirer of a self-driving car has priority and can't give that up.

  • Perhaps the car or its programmer is an "agent" for the owner/hirer and perhaps must prioritize that life over others. (I am not well-versed in the halachot of agency. I understand that a machine can't be an agent, but maybe the one who programmed it can be.)

  • Because a Jew seems to be allowed to sacrifice himself to save others (citation needed, but consider the military, police, and fire-fighters), we might reason that using such a car is fine so long as the owner/hirer is aware of the programming and "opts in". (Rambam says in Yesodei HaTorah 5 that self-sacrifice isn't allowed, though (h/t DonielF), so maybe there are additional factors.)

  • Because the torah places such a high value on human life, we might reason that driving carries with it higher risk of death but we now have the ability to globally minimize it, so we would be required to use this programming if it's available. (That is, the torah would have always preferred this but only now can we implement it.)

This future isn't that far away. Have any halachic authorities begun to explore this issue? What do they say?

Monica Cellio
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  • parallel http://judaism.stackexchange.com/q/77917/759 and http://judaism.stackexchange.com/q/10062/759 – Double AA Jan 11 '17 at 15:53
  • http://boulderjewishnews.org/2017/tesla-motors-pokemon-go-and-hair-splitting-talmudic-arguments/ – rosends Jan 11 '17 at 17:16
  • Talmudic story is in BM 62b. It’s actually a debate between Tannaim; the opinion you cite, followed by Halacha, is that of R’ Akiva. – DonielF Oct 16 '17 at 15:29
  • Car can’t be an agent. Cars don’t have free will. If a child can’t be an agent (BM 12b), certainly a car can’t. – DonielF Oct 16 '17 at 15:30
  • It’s not so clear that a Jew can sacrifice himself to save others - see Rambam, Yesodei HaTorah 5, where he paskens that if it’s not a case of Yaharog v’al Yaavor one may never give up his life. – DonielF Oct 16 '17 at 15:31
  • @DonielF perhaps the programmer of the car (who is presumed to not be a child) is an agent for the owner because the programming is deterministic. (So the car would be a tool and not the actual agent as I wrote.) If I hire an incompetent person to carry a torch through town and he starts a fire then I'm liable because I set him loose, right? Maybe the programmer is like that. On the other hand, no programmer I know would ever accept that liability, and thus wouldn't sell a self-driving car that might accidentally kill. – Monica Cellio Oct 16 '17 at 15:38
  • Funny that you bring that up. It’s addressed in the Mishnah, BK 59b, where it rules that an incompetent (read: deaf, insane, or child) who is sent with a fire - the sender is exempt from paying (though he will be obligated on the ultimate Yom HaDin). Kiddushin 42b learns from here that one who has someone else sin is exempt, since “the words of the Master and the words of the student - whose words should he obey?” (Con’t) – DonielF Oct 16 '17 at 15:42
  • The Gemara Ibid. 43a discusses murder, which is a debate between the Tanna Kamma and Shammai in the name of Chagai HaNavi. I believe we pasken like Shammai that one who hires a mercenary is liable. The debate hinges around whether David HaMelech was allowed to send Uriah to his death. – DonielF Oct 16 '17 at 15:42
  • Oh, did I get that fire case backwards? That's the passage I was thinking of; IIRC it contrasts a competent and an incompetent agent. Thanks for the comments; even though this question is closed, I made some updates. – Monica Cellio Oct 16 '17 at 15:43
  • השולח את הבעירה ביד חרש שוטה וקטן פטור בדיני אדם וחייב בדיני שמים שולח ביד פקח הפקח חייב – DonielF Oct 16 '17 at 15:45

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