spiritual danger or physical danger?

Question

Around the time of the Holocaust many people in Eastern Europe decided it was better to stay in Europe despite the grave physical dangers (sakana nefashot) rather than leave to America due to the spiritual dangers at the time, namely, that it was extremely difficult to stay shomer shabbat, keep kosher, etc. Is there an actual Halacha for one in such a situation?

i.e. what is worse physical danger or spiritual danger, i.e. danger of losing one's torah observance and that of his children

Answer 1

I'm not addressing the Holocaust aspect of the question, but see this, adapted from the work of the Lubavitcher Rebbe:

Pharaoh ordered the Egyptians to cast the boys into the river in order to cause their physical death. The same Egyptians were also told that they must keep the girls alive, that is, raise them in the Egyptian way of life. This would cause not physical death like the boys, but a spiritual death.

Since the Torah mentions both decrees together in the same verse, this indicates that "every daughter you shall keep alive" is a decree no less harsh than "every son that is born you shall cast into the river." To destroy the soul is as bad as to kill the body, in fact worse - for spiritual death has an absolute finality that physical death does not.

---

Thought exercise: Compare and contrast this idea with Rashi's commentary to Shemot 2:1:

and he remarried her. This is the meaning of went, that he followed [lit., he went after] his daughter’s advice that she said to him, Your decree is harsher than פַּרְעֹה. Whereas Pharaoh issued a decree [only] against the males, you [issued a decree] against the females as well [for none will be born].

Answer 2

I am not agreeing with your presumption

---

But I think this source answers your question

Shulchan aruch yora daiya 116.5, Ramo

וְכֵן יִזָּהֵר מִכָּל דְּבָרִים הַמְּבִיאִים לִידֵי סַכָּנָה, כִּי סַכַּנְתָּא חֲמִירָא מֵאִסּוּרָא, וְיֵשׁ לָחוּשׁ יוֹתֵר לִסְפֵק סַכָּנָה מִלִּסְפֵק אִסּוּר (ב''י בְּשֵׁם הש''ס). ‏

Tzuras hadaf

---

Chullin 10a

This, therefore, proves that regulations concerning danger to life are more stringent than ritual prohibition

---

---

The question changed

A Jewish man is responsible for his observance, in very hard times the requirements of his observance become less strict. There is no such a thing as danger to a man's Torah observance.

But a man needs to protect his live.

So it is clear that he should protect his live and go live in a place with hard Torah observance.

---

But a woman can be forced to change her religion, and it seems from Shulchan aruch harav 306.29 to be the same level problem as life saving, so I guess in the case of a woman (possibly Bing kidnapped).

She should still protect her life (leave the place of life threatening) since it is life threatening now but the Torah observance threat is in the future.

Answer 3

In our case, assuming that the level of danger for a particular individual is within the parameter recognized by halakha as dangerous, then it would be not only permissible, but obligatory to perform any non-cardinal sin to escape these circumstances. All the more so, it would be permissible to enter a situation where the sin itself is not guaranteed.

Sources:

There is a general principle in halakha, stated in the Tosefta Shabbat (9:22), that nothing supersedes the protection of life:

ואם היה דבר של סכנה אין כל דבר עומד בפני פקוח נפש

The only exception to this is in the case of cardinal sins (ibid 15:17):

דין הוא שידחו את השבת להחיות נפש בספק הא לא נתנו מצות לישראל אלא לחיות בהן שנ' אשר יעשה אותם האדם וחי בהם וחי בהן ולא שימות בהן אין כל דבר עומד בפני פקוח נפש חוץ מע"ז וגלוי עריות ושפיכות דמים

This is quoted by the Talmud as well (Yoma 82a), and the resultant law is codified by Rambam (Hilkhot Ma'akhalot Assurot (14:4) and Hilkhot Sh'vitat Assor 2:9) and the Shulhan Arukh (OH 617:2).

As is implied by the language above, even mere danger to life; not just certain death, allows one to violate any non-cardinal sin. This is also the implication of the Mishna Yoma (8:6) that one violates the Sabbath, even when this will not guarantee a life being saved, such as in a case where the victim may already be dead.

---

Edit: This has been getting a lot of commentless downvotes, so it could be it wasn't clear enough. To further clarify: it is pretty much impossible to prove the negative. If someone asks whether he may eat non-kosher food to save a life... On Tuesday, then if answer is 'yes', because the day of the week is not significant, then by definition there will be no sources that answer the question, and the best one will be able to do, is find general sources that omit the distinction. Similarly, here the OP introduces the possibility of a new legal category in the realm of yehareg v'al ya'avor; "irreligious". AFAIK this category does not exist as a relevant variable in the realm of yehareg v'al ya'avor.

Given that there is no evidence that "irreligious" is a discrete halakhic category in the realm of cardinal sins, halakhically, it is just the composite of multiple sins. Thus, the best possible answer quotes the classical sources and notes the universal ruling of ya'avor v'al yehareg for all non-cardinal sins, with no exceptions made for sins on Tuesdays, or the "sin" of being irreligious.

As mentioned in the comments,there is a category of sh'mad, which has specific parameters, in the realm of yehareg v'al ya'avor, but being "irreligious" is not sh'mad.