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There is a famous dictum: 'lo ba'shomayim he', meaning that after the torah was given at Sinai its rules, mandates and precepts are determined by man and not dictated by heaven. An example is when there was an argument about the halachic status of an oven the ruling followed the majority in spite of a clear proclamation from heaven which supported the minority view (Bava Metzia 86b).

I would like to know if this applies to mystical or kabbalistic matters as well. For example if a majority of kabbalists view a phenomenon in a certain way, and Rabbi Yitzchak Luria disagrees. Would we follow the majority or would we say that since Rabbi Luria was divinely inspired (perhaps by Eliyahu or through some other divine assistance) we would follow his minority interpretation instead.

In short, do we apply the principle of 'lo ba'shomayim he' to kabbalah?

Note: Please answer in general, and not just for the above example.

Shmuel
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not-allowed to change my name
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    Isn't it more related to the commandments in the Torah of Moses, rather than to other ideas? – Annelise Aug 30 '13 at 02:11
  • There is plenty of Torah about this question. – Hacham Gabriel Aug 30 '13 at 03:12
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    "Would we follow the majority or would [...] we would follow his minority interpretation instead". What do you mean by "follow"? – Tamir Evan Aug 30 '13 at 04:35
  • Related http://judaism.stackexchange.com/questions/709/what-is-the-machlokes-between-the-gra-and-baal-hatanya/8816#comment69240_8816 – Double AA Aug 30 '13 at 06:17
  • Who says that we go like a majority outside Beis Din? – ertert3terte Aug 30 '13 at 06:17
  • See Gevurat Ari chapter 4. – Hacham Gabriel Aug 30 '13 at 14:55
  • @TamirEvan adopt as the normative position. – not-allowed to change my name Aug 30 '13 at 20:01
  • @ShmuelBrin majority is invoked all the time outside of beis din. In fact, you have invoked it multiple times to explain why anyone should care about this question which is tagged [tag:mysticsm-kabbalah] – Double AA Sep 02 '13 at 07:10
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    I sill don't understand: In the Halakhic process, even the rejected views are correct( 'Elu ve-'Elu Divrei 'Elohim Chayim), to the extent that some say that at a future date( sometime after the Mashi'ach comes) Halakhah will be decided according to Beit Shamai. The only problem is, that with many correct views, what do we do in practice, and the solution is to follow the majority view, even against a divinely supported one. In kabbalah, what does choosing a "normative position" say about the rejected ones? With more than one [correct?] view, why do we need to choose one as "normative"? – Tamir Evan Sep 02 '13 at 07:13
  • @TamirEvan 1) AFAIK not every rejected view is considered part of elu v'elu 2) Can anyone say anything they want in the realm of kabbalah? Shouldn't kabbalistic statements come either from mesorah, logical deduction or other principles of expounding the torah? I'm hesitant to give an example because people often get bogged down in them but an example of a non-normative kabbalistic opinion are those of Shabbetai Tzvi (Yemach Shemo). – not-allowed to change my name Sep 02 '13 at 18:31
  • @not-Yahu (1) When i said "rejected" I meant "voted against", as that is what "rejected" means "[i]n the Halakhic process". Opinions not based on "mesorah, logical deduction or other principles of expounding the torah"( e.g. those of early Christian exegesis) wouldn't even be considered in that process. (2) In the example in the question, I understood you to be talking about deciding between the Kabbalistic views of the Ramban, the Ramak, Rabbi Yitzchak Luria, and others like them, and accordingly I asked. – Tamir Evan Sep 04 '13 at 13:24
  • @TamirEvan I would say the question encompasses all disagreements in kabbalah, which I assume stem from varyiants in mesorah or lack of understanding by the students, as did those in the talmud. – not-allowed to change my name Sep 08 '13 at 18:22
  • @not-Yahu Fair enough, but: (1) Aren't the minority opinions in the Talmud as normative and correct as the accepted majority ones? How does that work in Kaballah, where you are talking about one opinion( whether divinely inspired or of the majority) becoming normative? (2) In the example of Shabbetai Tzvi (Yemach Shemo), do his non-normative Kabbalistic opinions stem from a variant in Mesorah or lack of understanding, by him, of his teachers? – Tamir Evan Sep 13 '13 at 06:13
  • @TamirEvan (1)that's exactly what i'm trying to understand. (2) that's a good question! – not-allowed to change my name Sep 15 '13 at 21:21
  • Or Letzion 2, Introduction addresses this question, and he decides that we consider the Arizal's teaching as certain, while the decision of the Shulchan Aruch as majority opinion. Others (for example Yabia Omer OC 2:25) argue with him. See here: http://olamot.net/shiur/%D7%94%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%94%D7%A7%D7%91%D7%9C%D7%94 and here: http://olamot.net/sites/default/files/pdf/54.pdf on page 9-10. – Binyomin May 20 '20 at 03:37

2 Answers2

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We find in Sanhedrin 104b how the Chachamim were about to count someone in to the list of those not set to have a part in Olam Habbah. Then his father's figure appeared and begged for his sake, but was ignored. A fire sprung up on the edges of their benches and they ignored it. They likewise ignored heavenly voices calling out his merits. However, what stopped them was when the heavenly voice said, 'Should it be according to thy mind? he will recompense it, whether thou refuse, 'or whether thou choose; and not I etc.'

This is the attitude Mekubalim have when faced with the words of the Arizal. He knew and you assume, so you'll put aside your ideas and accept his. Actually, even in Halacha we put off our own judgement in favor of earlier traditions.

Although in Kabbalah, and non-Halachah in general, there is no Psak and Rov in the conventional sense (since it doesn't reach a Beis Din), there always exists the universal concept of consensus. When something is roundly rejected or accepted, that is taken as the true view. We find mentions of 'Daas Yachid' in topics not directly Halachah related.

HaLeiVi
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  • I would argue that, while not technically halacha, the declaration of someone as not having Olam Habbah is most definitely not metaphysics/kabbalah. Essentially, the question is whether the Earthly Beis Din has the capacity to adjudge someone as violating a Bein Adam LaMakom whose punishment is the loss of Olam Habah. Thus, their voting on the question does seem legitimate (since if the defendant were alive they could decree him liable for bringing sin offerings). – Isaac Kotlicky Mar 02 '16 at 13:46
  • @IsaacKotlicky Beis Din has the capacity to judge anything, including whether the hairs on a pomegranate are part of the peel or not, as long as it is a question of what to do. If there is no question of action Beis Din won't be deciding it, no matter how essential. They won't be discussing theistic evolution (unless it's for the practical purpose of considering someone a heretic). – HaLeiVi Mar 02 '16 at 13:57
  • Considering that this is included in the Mishnah, there does seem to be a relevant halachic outcome - perhaps, as you note, in determining when someone has "crossed the threshold" into heresy? So it is important for B"D to decide whether a historical person has indeed trespassed for determining future issues. – Isaac Kotlicky Mar 02 '16 at 15:04
  • @IsaacKotlicky This is a discussion of the Chachamim not a ruling in Beis Din. – HaLeiVi Mar 02 '16 at 15:26
  • R'Yehuda HaNasi codified Mishnayot to convey legal dialectic, not stories. Since Chelek specifically addresses "mi she'ayn lo chelek le'olam habah," this is a halachic discussion BY the chachamim that has PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS for future batei dinim. That is why it's included in Sanhedrin. – Isaac Kotlicky Mar 02 '16 at 18:18
  • @IsaacKotlicky Ideas are very important. Avos is also part of the Mishna. And yet, a Beis Din doesn't convene to finalize and put to rest differing opinions of non-practical topics. This is why הילכתא למשיח is a Kasha. There is no reason to finalize something with no practical application. If it is to know who is "right", well, we say that אלו ואלו דברי אלקים חיים. It is only the practice that has no room for multiple simultaneous options. And this is why when there is a overwhelming consensus deeming an opinion actually wrong, it is final even in non-Halacha. – HaLeiVi Mar 02 '16 at 19:18
  • @IsaacKotlicky Back on track, your first comment makes my main point much stronger. (Perhaps that was your intention.) If even in quasi-practical discussion that are actually brought to a vote we see that they followed the Bas Kol at the end, simply because this is something that heaven has a clearer view of, we would surely do that in matters that aren't brought to a vote in Beis Din. – HaLeiVi Mar 02 '16 at 19:23
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The Maharal explains that the halachah is always the central point of all opinions that can be brought to bear on a subject.

Therefore Torah lo bashamayim hi because the reasoning of shamayim is not relevant to determining the centrality of halachic opinion.

Kaballah is the way things work, not the ratzon Hashem that acts upon those things. Things can work concurrently in contradictory ways, so there is no reason to look for the centrality of approach regarding kaballah.

pcoz
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    "Things can work concurrently in contradictory ways" What does that mean? TTBOMK contradictions imply that I am an 7'5" astronaut and that Harry Truman is Zarathustra. – Double AA May 02 '16 at 02:52
  • @DoubleAA Are you conflating lies with contradictions? – HaLeiVi May 02 '16 at 12:56
  • @HaLeiVi No, I am not. Given as true two arbitrary claims, P and ~P, as well as the unknown claim Q = "I am an 7'5" astronaut and that Harry Truman is Zarathustra", we can first derive as true the claim P v Q via disjunction introduction. Then we derive as true the claim Q via disjunctive syllogism. QED. – Double AA May 02 '16 at 14:41