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The argument of Companions in guilt is meta-ethics says:

Even if there is no rational reason to think to think that something is ethical, that is irrelevant because there is no rational reason to think logically.

But I don't understand why this could be meaningful, because even if there is no rational reason to think logically, I cannot imagine how this would this would be an absurd.

Rieke
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I don't know why there wouldn't be a rational reason to think logically; maybe I'm conflating the technical sense of "logically" with some other sense. To the extent that I even understand the question, I suspect that the "companions in guilt" problem might be of a piece with an argument from metaepistemology:

Whereas Boghossian’s wider objective in defending (a version of) metaepistemological realism was to press back against “postmodern” thinking in the academy, Terence Cuneo’s (2007) defense of metaepistemological realism also comes in the service of a further objective, in Cuneo’s case, a defense of metaethical realism. Cuneo’s master argument is as follows:

  1. If moral facts do not exist, then epistemic facts do not exist.
  2. Epistemic facts exist.
  3. So, moral facts exist.
  4. If moral facts exist, then moral realism is true.
  5. So, moral realism is true (Cuneo 2007: 6)

Because Premise (2) is his central focus, Cuneo’s case for metaethical realism largely boils down to a sustained defense of metaepistemological realism (see also here Cuneo & Shafer-Landau 2014). Also, like Boghossian, Cuneo’s case in favor of metaepistemological realism proceeds as a negative case against various forms of metaepistemological anti-realism, including especially error theory and expressivism...

Or maybe the normativity of logic is relevant (c.f. the question of semantic normativity).

Kristian Berry
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  • Infamous "Ought/Is" Problem, and Hume's Law. Just generalized. People does no nothing for reason alone, but they are ultimate motivated by emotions. Although I have two arguments to think logically, ones is that unless you have a defective natural logic, is in your emotional interest to think logically; The second one is that pushing anti-logical theses cause inability of reason to the others and therefore is unethical do that. – Rieke Dec 13 '22 at 22:16
  • @Rieke, does the word "emotion" have a stable enough meaning to carry such weight? Or at least the supposed opposition of emotions to reasons can be called into no small question. IOW, doing something for the sake of an emotion might well be doing something for the sake of reason. Perhaps things like certainty and clarity, used as descriptions of reasoning, are themselves emotional states (sometimes we say e.g. "I feel certain that...). – Kristian Berry Dec 13 '22 at 22:47
  • It does. There is no thing that is done for the sake of reason, except those that are done for reason alone, have reasoned by natural heuristics of the subject in question to be done by the sake of reason alone with the motivation of a emotional attachment for reason. Although such "Exception", still requires emotion to be a driven force. The fact is that reason is a slave of the emotions – Rieke Dec 13 '22 at 23:04
  • @Rieke, I don't think that level of confidence is very useful when studying philosophy. And this is not only the Philosophy SE, it is the Philosophy SE. We aren't here to grind axes, conduct free-floating debates, etc. We're here to compile peer-reviewed information in answer to determinate questions. This particular SE has the almost-unique distinction that we can ask outright ethics questions here without violating network protocol (I suspect the LawSE shares this distinction to some extent, perhaps religious ones do too, albeit with more constraints). – Kristian Berry Dec 14 '22 at 00:29
  • Furthermore, then, given the intersection with formal logic and the foundations of mathematics, we are entitled to review specific arguments on such a basis. I can't say for sure but I think some of our best contributors are teaching assistants or professors in such topics. My only claim to relevance is that I have read virtually the entire Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and a good number of essays and books by other established philosophers besides, so I can easily provide well-cited answers to well-formed questions in the field. – Kristian Berry Dec 14 '22 at 00:35
  • If those kinds of answers, from myself or others, aren't sufficient to answer your questions, here, then you're not asking questions that fit the site. Perhaps a philosophy forum would be a more helpful place to post your inquiries and personal theories, then. – Kristian Berry Dec 14 '22 at 00:38
  • In any case I think that I should consult Psychology SE to get how I am in this. By the other side I would like to know if the reasons that I gave are convincing and/or "rational". – Rieke Dec 14 '22 at 00:48
  • I checked your page and the "Emotions are no longer considered structurally opposed to reason 
    Researchers continue to debate the circumstances in which emotions manifest various kinds of cognitive and strategic irrationality" called my attention.

    It look like no one is pressing attention with the definition of reason. There is two ways (1) "Non emotional" and (2) use of cognition. Certainly emotions are not 1 neither 2. But the fact use the forbbiden definition called my attention, this is rationality as a kind of behaviour that is prefered,

     – Rieke Dec 14 '22 at 03:06
  • this view is cerainly no Wertfrei thus antiscientific and puts in doubt the validity of the information contained in the page. – Rieke Dec 14 '22 at 03:07
  • @Rieke, since the site is telling me to avoid further discussion, I will leave off by noting that science is not value-free, neither as to its practice nor its abstract principles. Or even if it is, this is itself debatable, and there is no sufficient basis for discounting the SEP article, here, except by appealing to one's own ignorance of the debate. "Antiscientific" is too aggressive a description even if the debate could be settled in favor of the "value-free" thesis ("nonscientific" would be more accurate, but also not very relevant to metaethics, then). – Kristian Berry Dec 14 '22 at 03:32