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I know that one of the reasons given for our being limited by miderobonon laws is explained in Masechet Shevuot, 39a which says as follows (lifted from dafyomi.co.il)

i. "Asher Yeshno Po ha'Yom" refers to those who stood on Har Sinai. "Asher Einenu Po Imanu ha'Yom" refers to future generations and those who will convert later;

ii. This applies to Mitzvos received on Har Sinai (i.e. mid'Oraisa). We learn Mitzvos (mid'Rabanan) that will be given later, such as reading Megilas Esther, from "Kiymu v'Kibelu" - they fulfilled what they already accepted (i.e. whatever Mitzvos Chachamim will enact). (end of Beraisa)

But the braita is brought down with the question: "How do we know that we are obligated to commandments that are in the future, to be innovated, SUCH AS MEGILLAH?" (emphasis mine). The answer is given from the megillah, itself.

Ignoring the potential self-supporting loop (the megillah is authoritative because it says it is) by invoking the idea that Tosafot refer to, that the text is divinely inspired, this leads me to 2 questions

  1. Isn't the answer provided by the braita simply a local rule? The question is about megilla and the braita explains why we would be bound by the law of reading megilla! From where do we generalize this to anything else? If the question was about megilla and I had a proof from a different source which I could generalize then I could see the larger application, but when the answer points only to the example in the question why should I apply it to other cases?

  2. How does the answer apply to any edicts which came about AFTER the time of Esther? If the Jews (some? were all Jews living in Shushan and its provinces then, in the same way that ALL Jews were at Sinai -- the point the Braita started with) rose up and ratified their Sinaitic behavior during the megilla then they were accepting the things that came up between matan torah and that moment. Until we all "rise and accept" today, why are we bound to anything innovated between then and now?

Loewian
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rosends
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    I can't believe that this question hasn't been answered more fully. Nobody wants to quote the Rambam and Ramban in Shoresh 1 and Rav Elchonon in Divrei Sofrim? – הנער הזה Sep 21 '14 at 17:21
  • Dianno - I also wonder about the Circularity you mention. I posted a similar question requesting a collection of references: StackExchange Link; Will let you know if I find the answer! – elika kohen Nov 04 '15 at 23:20

1 Answers1

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Deuteronomy 17:11 על-פי התורה אשר יורוך, ועל-המשפט אשר-יאמרו לך--תעשה: לא תסור, מן-הדבר אשר-יגידו לך--ימין ושמאל

Deut. 17:9 & 11, (Chabad Link): (9.) And you shall come to the Levitic kohanim and to the judge who will be in those days ... (11.) According to the law they instruct you and according to the judgment they say to you, you shall do; you shall not divert from the word they tell you, either right or left.

This verse is understood to grant legislative power to the Sanhedrin for all time.

There were Sanhedrins in session up to several centuries after the time of Esther and that is where all fully-binding rabbinic Law as we know it comes from.

elika kohen
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Yitzchak
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  • but if that were the source, why would the gemara in shevuot have a question about whether the derobonons are binding? – rosends Jul 27 '14 at 19:31
  • Yitchak: This answer is misleading: (1.) The Context of Deut. 17 is about a form of government--which doesn't exist today; (2.) Even so, This doesn't resolve the question how Deut. is referring to Rabbinic Rulings rather than Government courts; (3.) Incorrect Facts: There hasn't been a Sanhedrin - (3.A) a new Sanhedrin in 2004, News Report. (3.B.) Many Attempts: Wikipedia Reference.
    • – elika kohen Nov 04 '15 at 23:03
  • @elika 1) The Rabbinic Laws and enactments (like Megilla) are from when there was a functioning Sanhedrin. 2) Your idea of "Government courts" is anachronistic, where you expect an outside body to ratify the relevant court. There is no such outside body in Judaism. – Yishai Nov 05 '15 at 03:01
  • @Yishai - (A.) Scripture does hint at "Judges Ruling", (Ru. 1, and Jdgs 2), but they rejected this and God, (1 Sam 8)--the *Sanhedrin* and *Rabbinic* Courts are foreign to these texts-equivocation fallacies; (B.) It is reasonable to see distinctions in the texts: "Judges, Officers, Elders, Kings, Priests, and Prophets"--all with authority to judge, (Dt. 21:2, Jsh. 8:33, Ez. 7:25, etc.) (B.1) Distinctions in "Jurisdiction": (B.2) Laws of God omitted; (B.3) Laws of King - 1 Sam 8:11; of God and of King - Ez. 7:26, etc; (B.4) Great/Small disputes - Ex. 18, etc. – elika kohen Nov 05 '15 at 21:13
  • @elikakohen, You have a foundational problem in your logic. Who assigned authority to "Ru." "Jdgs" and "Sam"? Anyway Elders = Sanhedrin (in many contexts), and what makes someone a Judge? – Yishai Nov 05 '15 at 21:20
  • @Yishai (A.) The claim that "Sanhedrin=Elders" is an equivocation fallacy, artificially ambiguous and injects Greek/Babylonian concepts; (B.) What makes a Judge? Reason affirms Scripture: Men of Truth; Hate Dishonest Gain; Know the Law of God; Know the Law of the King; Impartial; Does not darken counsel, (Jb 38:2)--Preserves the nearness of God's Command to the People, (Deut. 30:14); *And Most Importantly:* the Fear of God--Certain that the Judgments of God can be prevailed against by Men--under the Primary Ordinances of Mercy and Compassion, (Moses, David, Job, his friends, etc). – elika kohen Nov 05 '15 at 22:05
  • @elikakohen You avoided the main problem, and then just made an assertion without reason. Sorry if you don't like the etymology of the word Sanhedrin, but it functions in structure as described in the Torah (sits by the Beis HaMikdash, number of members, etc.). This answer asserts that the judges are the that functioned in the Sanhedrin. You do nothing but assert otherwise. Describing their qualities doesn't change anything. What makes them acquire the position? – Yishai Nov 05 '15 at 22:39
  • @Yishai To Reiterate: (A.) You claimed distinctions between "Government and Religious Courts" is anachronistic -- I proved this false by pointing to many examples in the texts; (B.) I argued that the Babylonian/Greek concept of "Sanhedrin" is foreign to Scripture -- Your Response is: [The Sanhedrin] functions in structure as described in Torah [.. Scripture?] -- but this claim is unsubstantiated and citations would help; *(C.) What *makes* them acquire this position? It is not a presumptive authority that is taken, but one that is appointed by a Higher Authority; – elika kohen Nov 05 '15 at 22:47
  • @elikakohen (A). You didn't prove anything false. I don't even see that you addressed it. (B) You are hung up on etymology. I could prove the claim easily (I already referenced the points). It would be better in the answer, I agree. (C) That is non-responsive, unless you are suggesting that a Prophet has to appoint them to it. – Yishai Nov 05 '15 at 22:50
  • @Yishai - Regardless, we are off topic. The Original Poster consedes the Circular Fallacy, but the "Original Question" remains -- (1.) How do the rules of interpretation, in this context, permit generalization to a broader context; and (2.) If the Torah was ratified by "ALL" of Israel at Sinai, but not necessarily true in Shushan -- How is perpetual authority presumed and imputed? – elika kohen Nov 05 '15 at 22:52
  • @Yishai (A.) Yes, please add those references. (B.) Yes, I agree that appointments by prophets is supported by the texts, and also appointments by higher authorities, (God, Kings, Priests, etc); (C.) But under no circumstance, *in the texts, was the appointment of Judges by other Judges sufficient to entail "Binding Authority" -- (Consider Samuel's sons) -- In fact, Scripture recognizes that times would change; (D.)* Rephrasing the OP: In this context, how can limited ratification, (self-ratification), be sufficient to entail perpetual authority and applicability? – elika kohen Nov 05 '15 at 23:08
  • @elikakohen, Samuel was a prophet. – Yishai Nov 06 '15 at 14:28